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Non-technical summary
We investigate the opposing impacts of two basic effects underlying the decision to
patent: the protective and the disclosure effect. On the one hand, patents grant a tem-
porary monopoly to an inventor, and thus, have a positive protective effect. On the
other hand, patent law requires the full disclosure of all technological details concerning
a patented discovery. As this transfer of enabling knowledge benefits rival firms the
profits of the innovator may decrease. Hence, the patenting decision of an inventor has
to balance the tradeoff between the benefits of temporary monopoly power, and the
drawback of the disclosure. Naturally, the positive effect may be enhanced by stronger
property rights while the negative effect is subject to the impact of the disclosure re-
quirement. The presented analysis consists of a theoretical part which is a condensed
version of Zaby (2010b) and an empirical test of the theoretical predictions.
The theoretical model introduces the patenting decision of a successful inventor into a
market with vertically differentiated products. The two considered firms are asymmetric
in their capabilities to adopt a new technology. Preceding the adoption decision an
inventor faces the choice between a patent and secrecy to protect his discovery. A
patent protects a given quality range from the entry of a rival. The main theoretical
result is that the inventor will patent his invention whenever his technological headstart
is moderate and that he will rather rely on secrecy whenever his technological headstart
is high.
The empirical analyzes test predictions derived from the theoretical results. Empirical
evidence supports the theoretical finding that the validity of a common economic intu-
ition regarding the interplay of technological leadership and the propensity to patent is
restricted to industry-specific characteristics: Our findings suggest that the propensity
to patent increases with the extent of the technological leadership of an inventor only in
industry sectors where the appropriability of an invention, given secrecy as the chosen
protective measure, is low. This leads to an increase of the propensity to patent, as
the positive protective effect of patenting gains weight. Furthermore, we find evidence
that the strength of patent protection has a mitigating effect on the market entry threat
perceived by an inventor, so stronger patents may lead to an increasing propensity to
patent.
Summarizing, this paper provides a possible explanation for differing patenting rates
observed across innovative industries. If, in an industry, new discoveries lacking legal
protection may be quickly appropriated by competitors, firms opt for patent protection.
The reason is that, in such industries, patent disclosure would not reveal additional
essential information as the technological know-how diffuses as soon as an innovation is
marketed.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht zwei gegenla¨ufige, einer Patententscheidung zugrun-
deliegende Effekte: den Schutzeffekt sowie den Offenlegungseffekt eines Patents. Ein-
erseits gewa¨hrt ein Patent seinem Inhaber ein tempora¨res Monopolrecht (Schutzeffekt),
andererseits fordert das Patentgesetz die Offenlegung aller technologischen Details der
patentierten Innovation (Offenlegungseffekt). Von diesem Wissenstransfer profitieren
Konkurrenten, so dass der Gewinn des Erfinders aufgrund des Offenlegungseffekts sinken
kann. Die Entscheidung zu Patentieren muss diese gegenla¨ufigen Effekte gegeneinander
abwa¨gen: Die Vorteile eines tempora¨ren Monopolrechts gegen den Nachteil der verplicht-
enden Offenlegung. Offensichtlich wird der positive Schutzeffekt durch eine Erho¨hung des
Patentschutzes versta¨rkt, wa¨hrend der negative Offenlegungseffekt von den Auswirkun-
gen einer Offenlegung beeinflusst wird. Diese Arbeit umfasst einen theoretischen sowie
einen empirischen Teil, die sich mit den Wechselwirkungen beider Effekte bescha¨fti-
gen. Der theoretische Teil stellt eine kompakte Zusammenfassung des Modells von Zaby
(2010b) dar, im anschließenden empirischen Teil werden die Aussagen des theoretischen
Modells empirisch beleuchtet.
Das theoretische Modell betrachtet die Patententscheidung eines erfolgreichen inno-
vativen Unternehmens in einem Markt mit vertikal differenzierten Gu¨tern. Die zwei
betrachteten Unternehmen sind asymetrisch hinsichtlich ihrer Fa¨higkeit, die neue Tech-
nologie zu adaptieren. Zeitlich vor der Adaptionsentscheidung wa¨hlt das innovative
Unternehmen eine ada¨quate Strategie, um sein intellektuelles Eigentum zu schu¨tzen:
Patentieren oder Geheimhalten. Ein Patent schu¨tzt einen exogen gegebenen Teil des
Produktraums vor dem Markteintritt eines Konkurrenten, erfordert allerdings die Of-
fenlegung der Innovation. Das zentrale theoretische Ergebnis ist, dass ein innovatives
Unternehmen eine Innovation dann patentiert, wenn sein technologischer Vorsprung ger-
ing ist, wa¨hrend es Geheimhaltung wa¨hlt, sobald sein technologischer Vorsprung einen
kritischen Wert u¨bersteigt.
Die anschließende empirische Analyse untersucht die theoretischen Aussagen. Die em-
pirischen Ergebnisse unterstu¨tzen die Aussage des theoretischen Modells, dass die allge-
meine Intuition u¨ber den Zusammenhang zwischen technologischem Vorsprung und der
Patentneigung nur unter bestimmten, industriespezifischen Bedingungen Gu¨ltigkeit hat:
Die Patentneigung steigt nur dann mit dem Grad des technologischen Vorsprungs an,
wenn in einem Industriesektor die Appropriierbarkeit einer Erfindung u¨ber Geheimhal-
tung gering ist. In solch einem Fall steigt die Patentneigung, je ho¨her der technologische
Vorsprung ist, da der positive Schutzeffekt eines Patents gegenu¨ber dem Offenlegungsef-
fekt an Gewicht gewinnt. Desweiteren findet die vorliegende Arbeit empirische Evidenz
dafu¨r, dass die Sta¨rke des Patentschutzes einen abschwa¨chenden Effekt auf die Mark-
tzutrittsdrohung hat, die ein innovatives Unternehmen subjektiv wahrnimmt. Hieraus
kann man folgern, dass sta¨rkerer Patentschutz zu einer steigenden Patentneigung fu¨hrt.
Zusammenfassend pra¨sentiert dieser Beitrag eine mo¨gliche Erkla¨rung fu¨r die beobachteten
Unterschiede in den Patentraten zwischen innovativen Industrien. Wenn in einem Indus-
triesektor Erfindungen ohne Patentschutz zeitnah von Wettbewerbern appropriiert wer-
den ko¨nnen, werden innovative Unternehmen ihre Innovationen durch Patente schu¨tzen.
Grund hierfu¨r ist, dass in diesen Industriesektoren die Offenlegung des Patents keine
zusa¨tzlichen Informationen preisgibt, da das technologische Wissen mit der Marktein-
fu¨hrung ohnehin offenbart wird.
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1 Introduction
The fact that not every innovation is patented has long since been discussed in economic
literature (see e.g. Horstmann et al. (1985), Anton and Yao (2004)). Empirical evidence
points in the same direction: Arundel (2001) explicitly analyzes the relative importance
of secrecy versus patents and finds that most firms rate secrecy as more valuable than
a patent. As Cohen et al. (2000) find, one major reason for the firms to refrain from
patenting is the disclosure requirement that is linked to a patent: The loss of a techno-
logical leadership caused by the required disclosure of proprietary knowledge may drive
the propensity not to patent, as a patentee has to fear that the transfer of enabling
knowledge induced by the mandatory publication of the patent application may benefit
his rivals by facilitating a rapid catch-up. This, however, depends on the relevance of
the technology embodied in the innovation for competitors. The main contribution of
this paper is the investigation of the decision to patent in the context of the competitive
environment of an innovative firm. The basic effects of intellectual property protection
versus the mandatory disclosure of the innovative know-how drive the propensity to
patent and affect the market entry threat perceived by an inventor. The decision of an
inventor between patenting and the alternative protective strategy secrecy is analyzed
analytically and empirically.
It is straightforward to assume that the considered effects of protection versus dis-
closure may vary throughout different industry sectors,1 and given that there is strong
empirical evidence that some industry sectors are characterized by higher patenting rates
than others (Arundel et al., 1995), providing a possible explanation for this empirical
evidence is a crucial part of our analyzes.
Patent law requires the full disclosure of all technological details concerning a patented
discovery. This transfer of enabling knowledge benefits rival firms so that on the one
hand, due to the disclosure effect of patenting, the profits of the innovator will decrease.2
On the other hand, patenting grants a temporary monopoly to the inventor and thus has
a positive protective effect. Following this approach the patenting decision of an inventor
has to balance the tradeoff between the benefits of temporary monopoly power, and the
drawback of the complete disclosure of enabling knowledge. Naturally, the positive
effect may be enhanced by stronger property rights while the negative effect is subject
to the impact of the disclosure requirement. Our analysis consists of a theoretical part,
which is a condensed version of Zaby (2010b), and an empirical test of the theoretical
predictions.3
1For an investigation of the heterogenous costs of disclosure via patenting see Heger and Zaby (2013).
2Note that actually the impact of such a disclosure effect is subject to the implemented patent law.
While in Europe a statutory research use exemption exists which allows the use of patented knowl-
edge for research purposes, in other countries, such as the U.S. a statutory research use exemption
does not exist. In terms of the underlying theoretical model the lack of a research use exemption
would mitigate the impact of the disclosure effect.
3The empirical analyzes presented here in some parts build on chapter 3 of Alexandra Zaby’s disser-
tation, see Zaby (2010a).
The theoretical model introduces the patenting decision of a successful inventor into a
market with vertically differentiated products. The two firms considered are asymmetric
in their capabilities to adopt a new technology. Preceding the adoption decision the
inventor faces the choice between a patent and secrecy to protect his discovery. A
patent protects a given quality range from the entry of a rival.4 The main theoretical
result is that the inventor will patent his invention whenever his technological headstart
is moderate and that he will rather rely on secrecy whenever his technological headstart
is high. The latter is due to the fact that in this case the positive protective effect of a
patent is outweighed by the negative effect of the required disclosure.
The crucial requirement for the empirical implementation of this theoretical model
is the combination of information on innovative activity of firms (including intellectual
property protection strategies) with information on the competitive environment as per-
ceived by the firms. Such data is provided by the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP),
which is the German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Several
questions concerning the competitive environment are included in the MIP 2005. To
reflect the strength of the protective effect, the theoretical model implements varying
degrees of patent scope. For our empirical analyzes, we use a measure based on the
International Patent Classification (IPC) following Lerner (1994) and additionally apply
a more traditional measure of patent scope based on forward citations.
Our empirical analyzes show that the common economic intuition that the propensity
to patent increases with the extent of the technological leadership of an inventor, can only
be confirmed for industry sectors in which the appropriability of innovative know-how
is low when relying on secrecy. In such a setting an inventor’s technological headstart is
reduced whenever he relies on secrecy leading to an increase of the propensity to patent
as the positive protective effect of patenting gains weight. Furthermore, we find evidence
that the strength of patent protection has a detrimental effect on the market entry threat
perceived by the inventor, so stronger patents may lead to an increasing propensity to
patent.
Several empirical studies aim at analyzing the propensity to patent. Ko¨nig and Licht
(1995) investigate the importance of patents compared to non-legal appropriation meth-
ods of research output and find that non-legal intellectual protection tools are more effec-
tive than patents. In a direct comparison of the use of patents versus secrecy, Hussinger
(2006) finds that patents are effective to protect innovations, i.e. commercialized inven-
tions, while secrecy is rather important for inventions which are in the pre-market phase.
Arundel and Kabla (1998) calculate the sales-weighted patent propensity rates for 19
industries. They find that only four industry sectors reveal patent propensities which
exceed 50 %.
We contribute to this literature by explicitly “looking at both sides of the coin” as we
divide the impact of patenting into a protective and a disclosure effect. Accounting for
the consequences that patenting has on the competitive environment further allows us
to gain deeper insights on the driving forces behind the decision to patent.
4For a thorough analysis of the optimal patent design regarding “leading breadth” see Denicolo` and
Zanchettin (2002).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a brief version of
the underlying theoretical model. Section 3.1 then states the predictions summarizing
the theoretical results and presents their empirical implementation. The following section
3.2 describes the data set and sample definition whereas section 3.3 presents variable
definitions and descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 presents our empirical results. Section
4 concludes.
2 The theoretical model
The model presented in this section is a condensed version of the model presented in Zaby
(2010b). In a setting of dynamic vertical product differentiation, a successful inventor
decides between a patent or secrecy in order to protect his invention, before determining
the timing of his market entry. The decisions of the inventor are modeled in a three
stage game.
On the first stage, the inventor – denoted by subscript i – chooses the protection
method for his discovery. His strategy is either to patent or to keep his invention secret.
On the second stage, firms choose whether to market a product of low quality or a
product of high quality given the inventor’s protection decision. On the third stage,
firms compete in prices. The game is solved by backward induction.
One crucial assumption of the model is the dynamic evolvement of product quality.
Following Dutta et al. (1995) and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001) we assume that
investing more time in research activities suffices to improve the quality of the new
technology over time. More precisely, the quality of the invention, x, increases by one
unit in every period without involving any further research costs. Thus, the time the
inventor needs in order to reach quality x is given by
ti(x) = x, (1)
implying that the investment of ti(x¯) = x¯ periods of time enables the inventor to adopt
the quality level x¯.
To capture the fact that the inventor has a technological headstart compared to his
rival, it is further assumed that at the time of the invention (t = 0) he has a technological
lead in height of γ which is common knowledge. This means that the non-inventor needs
to invest γ periods more than the inventor to reach the same quality level, i.e. his research
time is given by tj(x) = x+ γ. Whenever the inventor patents, he loses his lead so that
γ = 0.
If the inventor chooses secrecy to protect his invention, his intellectual property is
not perfectly appropriable. Subject to the inventor’s competitive environment part of
his technological leadership is lost in the absence of legal protection. We measure this
imperfect appropriability in the case of secrecy by the parameter λ and distinguish the
initial headstart of the inventor, γ˜, from his effective headstart, γ. In case of secrecy,
the extent of the technological lead of the inventor at any point in time t > 0 will differ
from his initial headstart if λ > 0. Consequently, the extent of the inventor’s effective
technological lead is defined by γ ≡ γ˜(1−λ) meaning that the non-inventor profits from
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decreasing appropriability as his research time
tj(x) = x+ γ˜ − λγ˜ = x+ γ (2)
is shortened by λγ˜ for λ > 0.
2.1 Price competition
Subsequent to the protection decision on the first stage and the quality decisions of the
firms on the second stage of the game, firms compete in prices. During the temporary
monopoly the first adopter earns monopoly profits πm per period. The entrance of the
late adopter changes the market structure to an asymmetric duopoly where the firm
offering the lower quality, i.e. the first adopter, earns πl per period and the firm offering
the higher quality, i.e. the late adopter, realizes profits πh per period, with πm > πh > πl.
The entry date of the early adopter is denoted by tl and the point in time when the late
adopter enters with a higher quality by th, respectively. All future profits are discounted
with the interest rate r > 0.
An early adopter’s overall profit consists of two parts: the monopoly profits he realizes
from his adoption in tl until the second firm enters in th and the subsequent duopoly
profits
L(xl) =
∫ th
tl
e−rtπm dt+
∫ ∞
th
e−rtπl dt. (3)
A late adopter earns duopoly profits πh per period starting with his entry into the
market in th with a high quality xh
H(xh, xl) =
∫ ∞
th
e−rtπhdt. (4)
2.2 Quality choices
On the second stage, the late adopter H has to decide when to adopt the new technology
after the early adopter L has already adopted the low quality xl. Optimization of
equation (4), with respect to the quality level xh yields the optimum differentiation
strategy given the early adopter’s quality decision, xl,
x∗h = xl +
1
r
. (5)
The crucial aspect in deriving the optimum quality choices is the distinction of the
respective research time functions of the inventor and the non-inventor in the two possible
scenarios: In scenario (I ), the inventor is the early adopter and his rival is the late
adopter. Thus, the respective research time functions are ti(xl) = xl and tj(x
∗
h) =
xl + 1/r + γ. Inserting the latter into equation (4) yields the overall profits of the non-
inventor, Hj(xl). The innovator as early adopter anticipates the optimum differentiation
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strategy of his rival as well as his research time. Inserting x∗h and tj(x
∗
h) into equation (3)
yields the overall profit of the inventor as early adopter, Li(xl). Optimization of Li(xl)
with respect to xl then yields the profit maximizing adoption quality for the inventor,
x∗l .
In scenario (II ), the non-inventor is the first adopter. Therefore the research time
functions change to tj(xl) = xl + γ for the non-inventor and ti(x
∗
h) = xl + 1/r for the
inventor as late adopter. Following the same manner as in scenario (I), the respective
overall profits of the non-inventor as early adopter, Lj(xl), and the inventor as late
adopter, Hi(xl), can be derived.
< Insert figure 1 about here. >
In figure 1, the dashed lines represent the alternative overall profits the inventor can
realize while the solid lines represent those of the non-inventor.
Whenever Lu > Hu, u = i, j, a firm prefers to be the first adopter and whenever
Hu > Lu a firm prefers to wait until a rival has entered and then enter as second
adopter.
The quality choices of the inventor and his rival depend on the inventor’s protection
decision on the first stage of the game meaning that the possible cases secrecy and patent
have to be distinguished. To avoid confusion, choice variables will carry the superscript
S if the inventor chooses secrecy and the superscript P if he patents his invention.
According to the profit functions in Figure 1, given secrecy both firms prefer to be the
first adopter at their profit maximizing entry date t∗u ≡ t(x
S∗
u ), u = i, j, as this would
maximize their overall profits Lu(t
∗
u), u = i, j. Since both anticipate that the other will
follow the adoption strategy adopt first in the area where Lu > Hu, none of them is
actually able to reach his profit maximizing quality level. Both have the incentive to
preempt the other until one reaches the adoption date at which early and late adoption
yield the same profits, which is the case at the intersection point of both curves, tI ,
where Lu(t
I) = Hu(t
I), u = i, j. Therefore, the loser of the race for being the first will
be the firm that reaches this intersection point first when moving backwards from t∗u,
u = i, j. A comparison of the intersection points of the inventor and the non-inventor
shows that if both firms follow the strategy adopt first, the inventor will always win the
preemption race by adopting at tIj , the intersection point of the curves Hj and Lj . At
this point, the non-inventor has no incentive to continue the race for being the first by
preempting the inventor as Lj(t
I − ǫ) < Hj(t
I). We thus state
Result 1 If the inventor chooses to keep his invention secret, he adopts first offering
the low quality and the non-inventor is the late adopter offering the high quality.
If the inventor chooses to patent his invention, a given range of quality levels, which we
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denote as the height of the patent φ, are protected by the patent.5 As a consequence the
non-inventor can only enter the market with a quality that exceeds the protected range.
This positive effect of patenting is accompanied by the drawback that the inventor loses
his technological lead due to the disclosure requirement, γ = 0. The inventor has an
incentive to patent in every situation where he is not able to adopt his profit maximizing
quality level, x∗l . In this case, a patent mitigates the threat of entry perceived by the
inventor: With a patent a given range of product space is protected from the entry of a
rival so that the inventor can postpone his entry long enough to realize a higher product
quality, xPi > x
S
i .
We distinguish three patent types according to their protectional degree: weakly pro-
tective patents, strongly protective patents and delaying patents. Patents of height
φ ∈ ]xSi , x
∗
i [ are defined as weakly protective patents protecting the quality range up
to φ. Patents of height φ ∈ [x∗i , x
∗
h[ are defined as strongly protective patents as they
allow the inventor to reach his profit maximizing quality x∗i . Both patent types mod-
estly mitigate the threat of entry as they still admit the non-inventor to follow his best
differentiation strategy, x∗j > φ. The strongest protectional degree is reached with de-
laying patents. They are defined as patents of height φ ≥ x∗h so that they affect the
differentiation strategy of the non-inventor: he is forced to postpone adoption further
into the future so a patent effectively mitigates the threat of entry.
Given that the inventor patents his invention, three alternative unique Nash equi-
libria in the subgame patent exist, depending on the strength of protection. They are
summarized as our
Result 2 If the inventor chooses to patent his invention the subgame patent has three
alternative unique and stable Nash Equilibria.
(i) With a weakly protective patent the inventor adopts the quality φ and the non-
inventor can follow his profit maximizing strategy. The perceived threat of entry is
weakly mitigated.
(ii) With a strongly protective patent the inventor adopts his profit maximizing quality
x∗i and the non-inventor can follow his profit maximizing strategy as well. The
perceived threat of entry is modestly mitigated.
(iii) With a delaying patent the inventor adopts the quality x∗i and the non-inventor is
forced to wait until he reaches the quality φ + ǫ. The perceived threat of entry is
strongly mitigated.
Thus, patenting reduces the threat of entry perceived by the inventor: The protective
effect of a patent broadens the inventor’s possible strategy choices, providing him with
the possibility to realize a quality level which yields higher profits than in the case that he
chooses secrecy. The extent of this effect is subject to the intensity of patent protection.
5In denoting the strength of patent protection as a patent’s height, we follow van Dijk (1996). Note
though, that as the distinction of the intensity of patent protection into breadth and height cannot
be implemented empirically, we refer to patent scope in our empirical analysis.
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2.3 The patenting decision
On the first stage of the game, the inventor decides whether to patent or to keep his
invention secret. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the three stage game can be
derived by comparing the inventor’s alternative payoffs subject to the chosen protection
mechanism: he will choose to patent whenever this yields higher profits than keeping
the invention secret. Due to the disclosure requirement, the inventor has to consider the
tradeoff between the positive and the negative effect of patenting.
The positive protective effect of a patent can be isolated by calculating the difference
between the inventor’s profit with and without a patent, ignoring the disclosure effect
by keeping γ > 0. By patenting the inventor is able to choose the higher quality xPi ,
while with secrecy he realizes xSi , where x
P
i > x
S
i . This defines
∆+ = Li(x
P
i )|γ>0 − Li(x
S
i )|γ>0 (6)
as the positive protective effect of patenting. This positive effect is opposed by the
negative disclosure effect. Due to the disclosure requirement linked to a patent the
inventor loses his lead meaning that technically speaking the technological headstart of
the inventor, γ, becomes zero. Consequently, as the non-inventor is now able to enter
at an earlier point in time, tPj (x) = x, instead of t
S
j (x) = x + γ, the duration of the
monopoly of the patent holder is narrowed. This negative patent effect can be measured
by the difference between the profit of the inventor with and without a technological
lead,
∆− = Li(x
P
i )|γ>0 − Li(x
P
i )|γ=0. (7)
Combining the protective and the disclosure effect yields the overall effect that patenting
has on the profit of the inventor, ∆P = ∆
+ −∆−. Inserting equations (6) and (7) this
total patent effect can be derived as
∆P = Li(x
P
i )|γ=0 − Li(x
S
i )|γ>0. (8)
Whenever the total patent effect ∆P is positive, the protective effect overcompensates
the disclosure effect and the inventor has an incentive to patent as this increases his
overall profits.
< Insert figure 2 about here. >
Figure 2 depicts the total patent effect for strongly protective patents. Obviously the
total patent effect ∆P takes positive as well as negative values. The intersection point
of the ∆P− curve with the x-axis defines a critical value of the technological lead, γ
P .
For γ = γP the protective and the disclosure effect cancel each other out. If the effective
technological lead is small, γ < γP , the protective effect dominates the disclosure effect
and the inventor profits from patenting his basic invention. If the technological lead
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exceeds the critical value γP the disclosure effect outweighs the protective effect so that
the total patent effect is negative and the inventor prefers to keep his invention secret.
This gives us
Result 3 The patenting decision of the inventor crucially depends on the extent of his
technological headstart. He will choose to
(i) patent if his technological lead is small γP ≥ γ,
(ii) keep his invention secret if his technological lead is high, γ > γP .
The value of λ influences this result indirectly: a decrease of the appropriability via
secrecy leads to an increasing propensity to patent as the effective technological lead,
γ ≡ γ˜(1 − λ), declines in the absence of patent protection. Thus, even a large initial
technological headstart diminishes in case of imperfect appropriability, meaning that the
protective effect of the patent will outweigh the disclosure effect as the latter is weakened
due to a low value of the appropriability parameter. This leads us to
Result 4 The propensity to patent increases whenever the appropriability via secrecy,
λ, decreases.
Intuitively, intensifying the strength of patent protection should have the same effect.
For weakly protective patents this is quite straightforward: a change of patent height has
no impact on the disclosure effect of a patent, but influences its protective effect. Thus, a
rise of φ would result in an upward shift of the ∆P− curve in Figure 2 shifting the critical
value γP to the right so that the parameter space in which the inventor decides to patent
would grow larger. With a strongly protective patent the inventor already realizes his
profit maximizing quality level and a further increase of patent height has no influence
on the protective effect of the patent, leaving the propensity to patent unchanged. The
case is different for delaying patents. They have a strong mitigating effect on the threat
of entry as they postpone the non-inventor’s entry date further into the future leading to
a rise of the profit of the inventor due to a longer duration of his monopoly. This again
results in an increase of the protective effect of patenting which raises the propensity to
patent. This gives us our final theoretical
Result 5 In the case of weakly protective and delaying patents, the propensity to patent
increases whenever patent height increases.
3 Empirical investigation
Building on these theoretical results we now turn to the empirical investigation of the
decision to patent. Our analysis accounts for both considered effects of patenting: the
protective and the disclosure effect. In a first step, we will condense the proposed
interdependencies into three predictions which we will then test empirically. Second,
we describe the data set, its extensions and the sample definition which we will use to
analyze the predictions. Third, we explain the variables we use to test our predictions
empirically, and finally, present our results.
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3.1 Theoretical predictions and their empirical implementation
The disclosure and the protective effect of patenting are driven by the three parameters
extent of the technological lead, γ, appropriability via secrecy, λ, and intensity of patent
protection, φ. Naturally, it is not possible to completely disentangle the protective
and the disclosure effect in empirical terms, so our analysis is to be understood as
distinguishing situations in which both effects have an impact, but one overcompensates
the other.
Before an innovative firm decides to patent it evaluates the tradeoff between the pro-
tective and the disclosure effect inherent in patenting. Hence, the best way to implement
and test both effects empirically, would be to relate them to the propensity to patent. As
stated before, the disclosure effect is driven by the technological lead and its interplay
with the imperfect appropriability caused by specific product market characteristics,
whereas the protective effect of patenting is contingent on increases in patent scope. In
the theoretical model, patent scope is known to the firm when deciding on patenting. In
the empirical analyzes, we are not able to directly link patent scope to the propensity
to patent, as the measures concerning patent scope, which will be described in section
3.3, can only be calculated ex post. During the filing process there is a certain chance
that changes to patent applications are made up to their publication, a fact which af-
fects patent scope. Nevertheless, the patentee has an ex ante assessment of the scope of
the potential patent, and this ex ante evaluation of the protective effect influences his
decision to patent. In order to grasp this empirically, our analyzes concerning the pro-
tective effect draw on a different cohesion: as the protective effect of a patent influences
the competitive environment on the product market by mitigating the threat of entry
of competitors, we test whether the scope of (lagged) patent applications is negatively
correlated to the threat of entry as perceived by the firms. Because of the close relation
between the protective effect of patenting and the threat of entry, our results allow in-
ferences on whether patent scope impacts on the propensity to patent. Our approach
can thus be specified as follows: We will first empirically investigate the impact of the
disclosure effect on the patenting decision and will then examine the theoretical results
regarding the protective effect of a patent.
According to the theoretical model, the disclosure effect ’s strength is subject to the
technological lead of the inventor. Hence, we focus on the relation between the actual
technological lead – which is the result of the interplay between the initial lead and
its potential reduction due to imperfect appropriability – and the propensity to patent.
An increasing technological lead strengthens the disclosure effect of patenting while the
protective effect remains unchanged. Following result 3 we suppose that the relation
between the technological lead and the propensity to patent is negative and state
Prediction 1 The higher the technological lead, the lower is the inventor’s propensity
to patent.
The theoretical model assumes that the effectiveness of appropriating the returns
from an innovation in the case of secrecy is exogenously given. Decreasing appropri-
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ability weakens the alternative “secrecy” such that the propensity to patent will be high
whenever appropriability is low, i.e., λ is high. This gives us
Prediction 2 The propensity to patent is high whenever the initial technological lead is
reduced by a low appropriability in the case of secrecy.
To translate these predictions into an estimation equation we come back to the defi-
nition of the effective technological lead stated in the theoretical model:
γ ≡ γ˜ − λγ˜,
which is included in the following estimation equation
P = β1 + β2TL+ β3APP + β4TL ∗ APP + Controls, (9)
where P denotes the patenting decision, TL the (initial) technological lead and APP
the appropriability given secrecy. In line with the theoretical findings, we conjecture a
negative influence of the technological lead (TL) and a positive effect of the interaction
term of TL and APP .6 As in the theoretical model appropriability has no direct effect
on the propensity to patent, we expect to find no significant effect of APP empirically.
The final prediction focuses on the protective effect which is subject to the extent
of patent protection, i.e. the scope of a patent. From result 2 we know that patenting
has an impact on the competitive threat. Again this impact entails the two opposing
effects of disclosure and protection: If an inventor chooses to patent, the mandatory
disclosure of the invention enables his rival to enter the market at an earlier point in
time, i.e. the inventor loses his lead. This effect is opposed by the protective effect of a
patent which may postpone the entry date of competitors due to the fact that they need
additional time to develop a product quality that lies just outside the patent protected
range. According to result 2 the latter effect should be stronger, the higher the level of
patent protection is. Combining this finding with result 5 we propose our final
Prediction 3 The threat of entry decreases with the intensity of patent protection, i.e.
patent scope. Thus, the propensity to patent increases when patent scope increases.
This translates into the following empirical model
TOE = β1 + β2TL+ β3APP + β4PS + Controls,
where TOE is the threat of entry, and PS reflects the extent of patent scope. For a
definition of TL and APP see the previous equation. In accordance with the theoretical
model, patent scope and technological lead should have a negative effect on the perceived
intensity of the threat of entry.
6For the reasoning behind this interrelation, recall that λγ˜ decreases the effective headstart γ and that
the overall patent effect increases whenever γ decreases, see Figure 2.
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3.2 Data set and sample definition
The basis for the empirical analysis is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) of the
year 2005. The MIP is an annual survey which is conducted by the Centre for Eu-
ropean Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim. The aim of the survey is to provide a
tool to investigate the innovation behavior of German manufacturing and service firms.
Regularly – currently every two years – the MIP is the German contribution to the
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). In 2005, the survey additionally contained an in-
vestigation of firms’ perception of their competitive situation. Thus, questions regarding
the characteristics and the importance of specific competitive factors like price or quality
as well as questions concerning the perceived competitive situation were included. To
capture patent scope we merge patent information provided by the European Patent
Office (EPO)7, by condensing the EPO data to the firm level.8 We identified only few
firms that stated to hold a patent in the MIP survey but had no equivalent entry in the
EPO data. Due to the missing information we dropped these observations.
In a next step we translate the crucial assumptions of the theoretical model into em-
pirical terms. Most importantly, the world in which the model and its results are valid
is one of innovative firms and vertically differentiated products. Thus, in order to test
our predictions, we first of all restrict our sample to innovative firms, i.e. we exclude
firms which did not launch a new product or process within the period 2002 to 2004.
Furthermore, we only include firms with a competitive situation characterized by quality
competition. In the 2005 survey, one question was included which refers to a charac-
terization of the competitive situation on the main product market as perceived by the
questioned firm. The firms were asked to rank the following choices according to their
importance: quality, price, technological advance, advertisement, product variety, flexi-
bility towards customers. In our sample, we keep all observations where firms indicated
that quality is the most, second or third most important feature of their competitive
situation. Finally, as patents are the only legal protection measure requiring the dis-
closure of the technological know-how embodied in an invention, we exclude all other
legal protection measures like trademarks from the sample and only include firms which
indicate that they either use patenting or secrecy (or both). Our empirical investigations
are based on 771 firms.
3.3 Variable definition and descriptive statistics
In the following, we will describe how we define the core variables of the two estimations:
the inventor’s patenting decision and competitors’ timing of entry decisions.
The dependent variable of the propensity to patent estimation is patenting which is
a dummy variable indicating whether a firm uses patenting to protect its intellectual
property. In our data set, about 60% of the firms applied for a patent in the relevant
period (see Table 2).
7The merge was conducted by Thorsten Doherr, ZEW, Mannheim, using a computer assisted matching
algorithm on the basis of firm names and addresses.
8We take all patent applications which have been filed by the sampled firms up to the year 2003.
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< Insert table 2 about here. >
The central variables of the propensity to patent estimation are technological lead-
ership and the appropriability via secrecy. Both are not straightforward to implement
empirically. In accordance with the definition in the theoretical model, we define tech-
nological leadership by the variable temporal headstart over competitors. Respondents
indicated whether the importance of a temporal headstart was high, medium or low and
our dummy variable indicates whether a respondent chose high.
Next, we turn to the empirical definition of the appropriability of the innovation
given secrecy. Imperfect appropriability may arise through different channels such as
unintended knowledge spillover, absorptive capacity of competitors, easiness of reverse
engineering, or technological proximity. We conjecture that – if firms’ competitive envi-
ronment is characterized by easy-to-substitute products – the relevance of the embodied
technology for competitors is high in the respective industry. Industries with easy-to-
substitute products embody any of the four channels of imperfect appropriability iden-
tified above. If products are easily substituted technological proximity, and the easiness
of reverse engineering are supposed to be high. At the same time, unintended knowl-
edge spillover can easily be absorbed by competing firms. Thus, the appropriability
of innovative know-how in the absence of legal protective measures is low. Hence, we
conclude that imperfect appropriability can be proxied by substitutability and construct
a dummy variable which has unit value if a firm’s relevant market is characterized by
easy-to-substitute products to capture imperfect appropriability. From the theoretical
model we know that the technological leadership of a firm may be reduced due to im-
perfect appropriability. To implement this fact in our empirical analysis we create an
interaction term (TL * APP).
Furthermore, we control for several factors that may influence innovation activities,
like firm size, human capital, R&D intensity, R&D cooperation, public R&D subsidies
and diversification, firm location (eastern Germany) and industry affiliation according
to NACE codes. We also reflect the structure and the characteristics of a firm’s rele-
vant market. We control for the number of competitors, the geographical dimension of
the relevant market, characteristics of the product life cycle (products become obsolete
rapidly) and quick changes in production technology. Table 2 provides an overview of the
variables, their descriptive statistics and a short description of how they were defined.
Regarding the second estimation of the competitors’ entry decision we try to capture
the threat of entry (TOE) as perceived by the inventor. We refer to a firm’s statement
whether its market position is threatened by the entry of new rivals, which is ranked
on a 4-digit Likert scale (fully applies, rather applies, hardly applies, does not apply).
This ordered variable is our indicator showing to what extent the protective effect of a
patent relates to the threat of market entry perceived by the inventor: we assume that
firms rank the threat of entry higher, the sooner a rival may be able to enter the market.
Thus, if a firm expects that the time until a rival enters is rather short, it should rank
the variable threat of entry higher than in a case when it assumes that the rival’s market
entry will take place at a later point in time.
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For the investigation of the protective effect, we need to define patent scope in empir-
ical terms. For our measure of patent scope we follow Lerner (1994) and refer to the
International Patent Classification (IPC) codes. The classification codes relate a patent
into specific technology clusters which vary in their aggregational level. As a robustness
check for this measure, we use a firm’s average number of patent citations per patent
application.9
Table 1: International Patent Classification (IPC)
Code of the European Patent Office
Section Class Subclass Group
Main Group Subgroup
A 01 B 33/0 33/08
Lerner (1994) argues that patent scope can be captured by a variation of the first four
digits of the IPC codes assigned to a patent (see also Austin, 1993). He used several
alternative approaches to validate this implementation. His argumentation mainly built
on a regression of the number of patent citations on the number of variations in the
assigned IPC codes; additionally, he conducted interviews with 12 intellectual property
attorneys. All validation procedures revealed that patent scope can be appropriately
implemented by variations in IPC codes.
For the empirical definition of weakly, strongly protective and delaying patents, we
need a more detailed differentiation than that proposed in Lerner (1994). In order to
capture the different levels of patent scope we distinguish between variations of IPC
codes at the class, the subclass or the group level.10 The IPC Guide gives a quite clear
statement on the relation between the IPC code and the scope of the respective patent.
The titles of sections, subsections and classes are only broadly indicative of
their content and do not define with precision the subject matter falling under
the general indication of the title. In general, the section or subsection titles
very loosely indicate the broad nature of the scope of the subject matter to
be found within the section or subsection, and the class title gives an overall
indication of the subject matter covered by its subclasses. By contrast, it is
the intention in the Classification that the titles of subclasses [...] define as
precisely as possible the scope of the subject matter covered thereby. The titles
9Patent scope is often reflected by patent (forward) citations (e.g. Hall et al., 2005, Harhoff et al.,
2003). The caveat of patent citations is that they only evaluate patent scope ex post. We assume
that the inventor anticipates the scope of his patent, but that it is revealed to the empiricist only
after several years.
10To examine whether this distinction of variations in the IPC codes is an appropriate measure for
patent scope we use the regression-based robustness check implemented by Lerner (1994). We use
patent data from 1995 and its citations up to 2005 to escape the problem of recentness. Our Poisson
regressions reveal two significant effects: A strongly positive effect of our delaying patent indicator
and a negative effect for the indicator of weakly protective patents.
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of main groups and subgroups [...] precisely define the subject matter covered
thereby [...]
(§68, IPC Guide)
In line with the above quote, since “the class title gives an overall indication of the
subject matter covered by its subclasses”and as variations at the sectional level (including
subsections), only “very loosely indicate the scope” of the respective patent, we define
the alternative patent scopes weakly protective, strongly protective and delaying patents
starting with variations at the class level. Thus, we implement the alternative patent
scopes from our theoretical model as follows: Whenever a classification symbol differs
on the level of classes or subclasses, we characterize the respective patent as delaying.
We define a patent as strongly protective, if the IPC codes vary in groups and as weakly
protective, if the IPC codes differ in subgroups. Additionally, all patents with a single
IPC code are classified as weakly protective patents. For every firm we count all delaying,
strongly and weakly protective patents and divide them by the number of employees as
we assume that larger firms tend to have larger patent portfolios. For further robustness
checks, we move the frontiers of each category.
Again, we control for several factors that may influence our dependent variables. Most
of the control variables coincide with those of the propensity to patent–estimation. We
further include capital intensity as a measure of market entry barriers and an indicator
for market novelty. The respective descriptions can again be found in table 2.
3.4 Empirical results
This section is split into two parts according to which effect of patenting we focus on.
First we discuss the results regarding the disclosure effect and evaluate prediction 1 and
2 focussing on the propensity to patent. Second, we present the results with respect to
the protective effect which assess prediction 3 looking at the competitors’ entry decision.
The disclosure effect of patenting
The theoretical model predicts that firms decide to either patent or keep their invention
secret taking into account the technological lead and its potential reduction due to im-
perfect appropriability via secrecy. We test predictions 1 and 2 concerning the disclosure
effect of patenting by estimating a probit model with robust standard errors displaying
marginal effects evaluated at the sample means with standard errors calculated using
the delta method. This estimation also includes an interaction term of technological
lead and appropriability in order to test prediction 2. We calculate its marginal effect
using the method proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) and present a graphical analysis of
its marginal effects as suggested by Hoetker (2007) referring to the continuous nature of
the technological lead.
In our theoretical model, patenting and secrecy are mutually exclusive protection
strategies. In contrast to this theoretical construct, many survey firms state the use
of both patents and secrecy. There are several explanations for this observation, e.g.,
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firms may conduct several innovation projects which they protect by different means.
Alternatively, only parts of an invention may be patented, especially those which may
be re-engineered easily. Following these arguments patenting and secrecy should not
be seen as exclusive protection strategies. To take this into account, we define a new
dependent variable and estimate a multinomial logit model using the following measure:
patent secrecy =


0 if patent = 0 & secrecy = 1
1 if patent = 1 & secrecy = 0
2 if patent = 1 & secrecy = 1


with the base outcome 0. As, again, the interplay of technological lead and imper-
fect appropriability and its relation to the propensity to patent is a crucial part of the
investigation of the disclosure effect, we analyze the interplay graphically in figure 4.
A crucial assumption of the theoretical model is that the firms only conduct one
innovation project. To account for this we include a robustness check by estimating the
empirical models with a sample including only firms with less than 250 employees. In
this reduced sample, firms should only have one (or only few) innovative product(s).11
The estimation results of the probit and the multinomial logit can be found in table 3
and in figures 3 and 4.
A central result of the theoretical model is that the propensity to patent decreases with
the technological lead (prediction 1). In line with the theoretical prediction, our empirical
results display a negative sign of the respective marginal effect, but the overall effect of
the technological lead turns out to be insignificant.12 Taking into account the fact that
firms’ intellectual property protection strategies possibly involve the combination of both
protective measures, the results of the multinomial logit in table 3 allow us to draw a
more accurate picture. Regarding the technological lead the multinomial logit reveals
that using patenting as the only protection mechanism for innovative products is indeed
negatively linked to the technological lead, whereas a positive relation is found for the
contemporaneous use of patenting and secrecy. Both results are relative to the base
category of choosing only secrecy. This finding is perfectly in line with prediction 1.
Our result may be interpreted in line with Hall and Harhoff (2012) who state that firms
only disclose that part of an invention by patenting it, which can most easily be re-
engineered – as this is the part with the highest exposure to expropriation – and thereby
try to omit the disclosure of essential know-how in their patents.
11We acknowledge that this robustness check can only be interpreted as an indicator for one-innovation
firms. However, we are confident that the test is of relevance, as the emergence of multiple innovation
projects should be positively correlated with the number of employees. Furthermore, we presume
that small firms conduct research in technologically related areas meaning that the protection strate-
gies as well as the respective competitive environments are most likely similar.
12A first tentative explanation for this finding could be that the theoretical model disregards several
mandatory patentability requirements, e.g. a sufficiently high inventive step. Thus, while the model
predicts that the propensity to patent is high whenever the technological lead is small, it actually
may be the case that the respective extent of the technological headstart leading to a patent in
theoretical terms, is de facto not eligible for patent protection as it does not incorporate a sufficient
inventive step.
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< Insert table 3 about here. >
The other central theoretical result regarding the disclosure effect and its impact on
the propensity to patent is that in industries which are characterized by low appropri-
ability via secrecy the initial technological lead may be reduced to such an extent that
the propensity to patent increases (result 4). Empirically, we implement this effect by
introducing an interaction term of technological lead and appropriability (TL ∗ APP )
and analyze its relation to the propensity to patent. Our findings provide evidence that
the empirical relation is in line with the theoretical result and thus support prediction
2. For the probit estimation, figure 3 shows graphically that in industries characterized
by low appropriability, the relation between technological lead and the propensity to
patent is positive. Figure 4 displays the results for the interaction term in the multino-
mial logit setting. We see that the alternative of protecting intellectual property only
by patents relative to the alternative of only choosing secrecy exhibits no difference be-
tween firms in industries characterized by high or low appropriability. Thus, the effect
of the interaction term is dominated by the negative link between technological lead and
the propensity to use only patents. The multinomial logit allows us to account for a
strategy mix, i.e. the contemporaneous use of patenting and secrecy, to protect newly
generated knowledge. From figure 4, we can deduce that evidently a low appropriability
and an increasing technological lead positively influence the joint use of patenting and
secrecy. Finally, as suggested by theoretical result 4, appropriability itself displays no
statistically significant relation with the propensity to patent.
< Insert figure 3 about here. >
< Insert figure 4 about here. >
As a robustness check, we look at the reduced sample of firms with a maximum of 250
employees. We can confirm that our results also hold for this reduced sample Assuming
that these firms most probably meet the theoretical assumption of one-product firms
we are able to interpret our results as follows: In line with prediction 1 and 2, firms
display a higher propensity to patent in situations in which their technological lead is
low. A high technological lead may be associated with an increasing attractiveness of
secrecy or a mixture of patenting and secrecy. Particularly, in environments in which the
technological lead may be largely reduced by imperfect appropriability via secrecy, firms
may opt for a mixture of patenting and secrecy as the relation between the propensity
to use patenting and secrecy and the interaction term is significantly positive compared
to the propensity to only use secrecy.
Turning to our control variables we can state that our results are in line with the styl-
ized facts that the patenting behavior of firms as well as the joint use of patenting and
secrecy is positively linked to the size of a firm, to its R&D intensity, to R&D subsidies
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as well as to the engagement of a firm in R&D cooperations. Interestingly, the control
variables reflecting the strength of competition with respect to competitors, customers
and regional dimensions are mainly insignificant. One exception is a significantly pos-
itive relation with non EU . A possible explanation for this result is that firms which
are inter alia active in non-EU markets tend to rate protection in their home-market
as more important than firms operating solely in the German home-market. This ef-
fect may prevail due to the fact that those firms fear the entry of foreign firms with
substitute products. Further, we find that R&D cooperation has a positive significant
link to the propensity to patent, whereas being located in Eastern Germany has a neg-
ative association. Generally, empirical evidence based on firm-level surveys finds that
the propensity to patent varies by industry sectors. Our industry dummies are jointly
significant hinting at structural differences between industry sectors.
The protective effect of patenting
Prediction 3 – regarding the protective effect of patenting – is tested by estimating
an ordered probit with robust standard errors for the threat of entry by competitors.
Again, marginal effects of the estimation on the timing of competitors’ market entry
are evaluated at the samples means and the respective standard errors are obtained
using the delta method. The protective effect is represented by the extent of patent
scope as described in Section 3.3. First, as the market structure and characteristics are
surely linked to the competitors’ timing of entry but at the same time are endogenous,
we first estimate a basic model ignoring the specificities of the relevant market. Then
we stepwise include the technology dimension of the relevant market and the competitive
side. Furthermore, we conduct robustness checks (i) estimating the model with a reduced
sample of firms with not more than 250 employees, (ii) altering the definition of patent
scope, and (iii) using alternative measures for patent scope. The results including all
robustness checks are displayed in tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 shows the results of the ordered probit for the estimation of the threat of
entry on patent scope. The findings are robust to variations (i)− (iii) and confirm that
a larger patent scope reflected by the number of delaying patents per 100 employees
is negatively related to the threat of entry, implying that a reduced threat of entry is
associated with larger patent scope. This finding is in line with prediction 3.
< Insert table 4 about here. >
Robustness check (i) is included in table 4 and the further robustness checks are pro-
vided in table 5. For robustness check (ii), we first moved the somewhat arbitrary sepa-
ration of delaying and strongly protective patents to the left so that delaying patents are
defined as patents with varying IPC codes at the level of Sections and Classes. Strongly
protective patents are then defined by variations in Subclasses and Main Groups. Sec-
ond, using this new limit between delaying and strongly protective patents we varied
the frontier between strongly and weakly protective patents between Subclasses and
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Main Groups. All variations in the definition of delaying, strongly and weakly protec-
tive patents do not alter the previous results. The final robustness check (iii) using
the number of forward citations per patent application as a measure for patent scope
and additionally accounting for the number of patent applications per 100 employees
shows that even using alternative measures of patent scope does not change our results
concerning the protective effect of patenting as we find a negative link between citations
and the threat of entry. Summarizing we can conclude that we find strong empirical
evidence supporting prediction 3 that a larger patent scope is linked to a delayed market
entry of competitors.
< Insert table 5 about here. >
In contrast to the theoretical conjecture, we find no significant link of the competitor’s
market entry decision with the technological lead. Nevertheless, a positive relation with
appropriability via secrecy is apparent. This is relatively intuitive as competitors benefit
from the disclosure given imperfect appropriability. A positive relation can also be
confirmed for quickly changing technologies and the number of firms in a market.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis of the decision to patent in light of the positive protective
and the negative disclosure effect of patenting. By this the decision to patent is analyzed
in the context of the competitive environment of firms. The first part of the paper is
dedicated to a brief presentation of a theoretical model (Zaby, 2010b) from which we
draw our testable predictions. In the second empirical part of the paper, we present
empirical evidence for these predictions.
The theoretical model comes to the conclusion that while patenting may intensify the
competitive threat perceived by an inventor due to the mandatory disclosure require-
ment, it may also mitigate the competitive threat by its protective effect. In the end,
the predominant effect overcompensates the other, and thus, determines the decision to
patent. We condense the theoretical results into three predictions reflecting the twofold
effects of patenting. Predictions 1 and 2 refer to the disclosure effect, supposing that an
increasing technological lead is negatively linked to the propensity to patent and that
the appropriability via secrecy reduces even an initially high technological lead and thus
displays a negative relation to the propensity to patent. To test these predictions we
implement an interaction term of technological lead and appropriability.
Predictions 1 and 2 are tested looking at the propensity to patent. First, we directly
translate the theoretical presumption and estimate a probit model of the decision patent
vs. secrecy. The data, however, reveals that patenting and secrecy are not mutually ex-
clusive which leads to a richer set of alternatives. This is transferred in empirical terms
by estimating a multinomial logit accounting for three different protection strategies:
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the sole use of secrecy or patents and the joint use of patenting and secrecy. In the
probit esimation, we do not find support for prediction 1. However, the multinomial
logit provides an explanation: while the technological lead is negatively associated with
the propensity to use only patenting to protect an innovation, the joint use of patenting
and secrecy turns out to be positively associated with the technological lead. Both re-
sults support prediction 1 that an increasing technological lead is related to a decreasing
propensity to patent. Both estimations – the probit and the multinomial logit – provide
evidence supporting prediction 2 due to the fact that the effect of the interaction term
is found to be positive and significant. The probit result – that a technological lead
reduced by industry-specific imperfect appropriability is associated with an increasing
propensity to patent – is confirmed by the multinomial logit result for the mixed protec-
tion strategy. If firms opt for patents as exclusive protection measure the link is reversed.
The multinomial logit results thus allow us to draw a more detailed picture of the choice
of protection strategies for innovative products.
Prediction 3 concerns the protective effect and states that an increasing patent scope
decreases the threat of entry. To analyze prediction 3, we provide the results of an
ordered probit estimation with respect to the threat of entry measured on a four-digit
Likert scale. We interpret a lower threat of entry as an indicator that potential com-
petitors postpone their market entry. To implement the differences in patent scope
empirically, we build on previous work by Lerner (1994) and use the variations of IPC
codes as a measure for the intensity of patent protection. In order to substantiate our
results, we provide several robustness checks: We vary the definition of patent scope by
implementing alternative frontiers for the different levels of protection based on the IPC
classification. Furthermore, we use an alternative measure for patent scope based on
forward citations. All results confirm prediction 3 and show that a low threat of entry
is positively associated with the larger extent of patent scope.
Aside from the advancement of Lerner’s measure for patent scope our main contribu-
tion is the containment of a stylized fact: We find that the common economic intuition
that the propensity to patent is higher, the larger the technological advance an innova-
tion embodies, actually only holds in industry sectors where appropriability via secrecy
is imperfect. Thus, our theoretical finding that the propensity to patent decreases, the
higher the technological lead of an innovator is, does not contradict common intuition
but constrains its validity to industry sectors where the appropriability via secrecy is
low.
Our empirical test suffers some limitations. First, the empirical translation of the
theoretically identified core driving forces of the propensity to patent is not perfect –
particularly, imperfect appropriability via secrecy which is reflected by the easiness of
substitutability. Although a close relation between both concepts exists in some circum-
stances this relation does not always hold, e.g. it is a valuable strategy for competitors
to find adequate substitutes for an innovative product if its imitation is blocked by a
patent (see e.g. Polidoro and Toh (2011)’s argumentation for the pharma industry). A
possible remedy for this limitation would be to use shifts in patent legislation influencing
the impact of disclosure requirements.
A further limitation of our analysis is that we do not take into account other strategic
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components of the patenting decision such as defensive motives. Finally, looking at one-
product firms, our theoretical model allows for deeper insights at the level of innovation.
The empirical data, however, only allow us to analyze the firm level. We try to heal this
by providing evidence for small firms as they generally have only one innovation project
or at least solely a limited number, and predominantly operate in one product market.
However, we acknowledge that this is only a rough approximation of one-product firms.
Information on specific innovation projects and the related protection strategies would
be essential and would allow for a deeper understanding of the role of the countervailing
effects of protection vs. disclosure on the patenting decision.
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Figure 3: Relation of the propensity to patent with varying technological lead for differ-
ent levels of the relevance of the embodied technology – probit estimation
Source: MIP 2005, authors’ calculations.
Note: Average predictions for probit estimation. We look at two different levels of REL: 0 and 1.
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Figure 4: Relation of the patenting and secrecy with varying technological lead for dif-
ferent levels of the relevance of the embodied technology – multinomial logit
estiamtion
Source: MIP 2005, authors’ calculations.
Note: Average predictions for multinomial logit. We look at two different levels of REL: 0, and 1.
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Tables
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Description
patent 0.599 0.490 0 1 Patent application between 2002 and
2004
secrecy 0.885 0.320 0 1 Trade secrecy to protect innovation be-
tween 2002 and 2004
technological lead 0.594 0.491 0 1 Temporal headstart over competitors
highly important
appropriability 0.682 0.466 0 1 easy-to-substitute products in main
market fully or rather applies
log(employees) 4.577 1.696 0.693 9.152 Number of employees in 2002
human capital 0.263 0.264 0.000 1.000 Share of employees holding a university
degree in 2002
R&D intensity 0.062 0.116 0.00 0.792 Expenditures for in-house R&D per
sales in 2003
cooperation 0.455 0.498 0 1 Research cooperation with competi-
tors, customers, universities
diversification 0.657 0.244 0 1 sales share generatedby three most im-
portant customers
subsidy 0.418 0.493 0 1 Public subsidies
large no. of firms 0.134 0.340 0 1 More than 15 competitors in main
market
medium no. of firms 0.204 0.403 0 1 Between 6 and 15 competitors in main
market
product old 0.091 0.287 0 1 competitive environment: products
rapidly obsolete (fully applies)
tech. obsolete 0.466 0.499 0 1 competitive environment: technolo-
gies change quickly (fully and rather
applies)
EU 0.676 0.468 0 1 Main product market: EU without
Germany
non EU 0.489 0.500 0 1 main product market: outside EU
east 0.284 0.451 0 1 Firm located in eastern Germany
threat of entry 1.455 0.767 0 3 Market position threatened by entry
(3=applies)
capital intensity 0.089 0.144 0.000 1.575 Tangible assets per employee in 2002
market novelty 0.615 0.487 0 1 Market novelty introduced XXX
delaying 0.171 0.572 0.000 4.505 No. of patents with delaying scope (per
100 employees)
strongly protective 0.028 0.121 0.000 1.066 No. of patents with large scope (per
100 employees)
weakly protective 0.062 0.237 0.000 2.041 No. of patents with small scope (per
100 employees)
citations 0.312 0.634 0.000 3.333 No. of citations per patent
patent stock 0.564 1.600 0.000 13.993 Patent stock per 100 employees
PAT = 1, SEC = 0 11.5%
PAT = 1, SEC = 1 48.4%
PAT = 0, SEC = 1 40.1%
PAT = 0, SEC = 0 00.0%
No. of observations 771
Notes: The 11 industries we control for are ind1: Agriculture, Food, Textile; ind2: Mining, Coke,
Fuel, Electricity; ind3: Wood, Paper, Publishing, Printing, Furniture, Recycling; ind4: Chemicals,
Plastics, Glass; ind5: Metals; ind6: Machinery, Motor Vehicle without Aerospace; ind7: Office Ma-
chinery; ind8: Precision Instruments, Aerospace; ind9: Telecommunication and Computer Services;
ind10: R&D services; and ind11: Consumer-related Services like hotels, gastronomy.
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Table 3: Results of the Patenting Decision Estimation
all firms firms with ≤ 250
Probit Multinomial Logit Probit Multinomial Logit
PAT=1,SEC=0 PAT=1,SEC=1 PAT=1,SEC=0 PAT=1,SEC=1
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
(Std. Err) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
technological lead -0.071 -.060*** 0.122*** -0.011 -0.033*** 0.098*
(0.060) (0.015) (0.046) (0.050) (0.011) (0.052)
appropriability -0.053 0.012 -0.010 -0.018 0.003 -0.018
(0.061) (0.012) (0.051) (0.051) (0.009) (0.056)
TL * APP 0.124* 0.130
(0.070) (0.085)
log(employees) 0.061*** -0.002 0.104*** 0.072*** 0.001 0.080***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.017) (0.024) (0.003) (0.026)
human capital 0.095 -0.051 0.239* -0.017 -0.027 0.033
(0.085) (0.033) (0.134) (0.125) (0.023) (0.139)
R&D intensity 0.667*** 0.169*** 0.993*** 1.029*** 0.120*** 0.986***
(0.156) (0.049) (0.337) (0.291) (0.032) (0.333)
cooperation 0.077* -0.014 0.130** 0.087 -0.008 0.123**
(0.040) (0.013) (0.052) (0.059) (0.010) (0.062)
diversification -0.134** -0.021 -0.139 -0.209** -0.023 -0.164
(0.065) (0.020) (0.093) (0.103) (0.014) (0.113)
subsidy 0.074* -0.000 0.113** 0.107* 0.000 0.116*
(0.040) (0.013) (0.056) (0.061) (0.010) (0.064)
large no. of firms -0.067 -0.024 0.031 -0.097 -0.010 -0.058
(0.048) (0.018) (0.074) (0.076) (0.012) (0.086)
medium no. of firms -0.011 0.004 -0.017 -0.008 0.003 -0.015
(0.042) (0.013) (0.061) (0.063) (0.009) (0.071)
product old 0.012 -0.045 0.056 0.001 -0.039 0.066
(0.056) (0.032) (0.081) (0.084) (0.024) (0.088)
tech. obsolete -0.049 -0.014 -0.042 -0.101** -0.011 -0.082
(0.032) (0.011) (0.047) (0.049) (0.008) (0.055)
EU 0.026 0.012 0.003 -0.023 0.001 -0.035
(0.043) (0.014) (0.058) (0.059) (0.009) (0.064)
non EU 0.104*** 0.003 0.132*** 0.152*** 0.007 0.149**
(0.038) (0.011) (0.050) (0.055) (0.008) (0.060)
east -0.093** 0.007 -0.149** -0.064 -0.003 -0.060
(0.039) (0.012) (0.058) (0.054) (0.008) (0.060)
industry dummies included included included included
Log likelihood -394.35 -573.20 -305.45 -418.56
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.240 0.231 0.176 0.189
χ2(all) 194.97*** 2909.62*** 113.11*** 3061.68***
χ2(ind) 31.26*** 1066.02*** 13.69 2015.12***
No. of observations 771 771 535 535
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.1 PHT: Parameter homogeneity test.
Notes: This table depicts the marginal effects of the probit estimations regarding the determinants of the patenting decision and of the
multinomial logit model with respect to patenting vs. secrecy. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means. The marginal effect of
the probit’s interaction term is obtained according to Ai and Norton (2003) and analyzes graphically (see Figures 3 and 4). Standard errors
are calculated with the delta method.
The definition of the industry dummies can be found in the notes of Table 2. χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies.
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Table 4: Ordered Probit for Threat of Entry Estimation
Basic Model Technology Competition Firms with ≤ 250
threat strong medium weak no strong medium weak no strong medium weak no strong medium weak no
delaying -0.034** -0.047** 0.051** 0.030** -0.035** -0.048** 0.052** 0.031** -0.029** -0.040** 0.043** 0.026** -0.033** -0.049** 0.056** 0.026**
(0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012) (0.016) (0.022) (0.026) (0.011)
strongly prot. 0.022 0.030 -0.032 -0.019 0.039 0.054 -0.059 -0.035 0.049 0.068 -0.074 -0.044 0.053 0.078 -0.090 -0.041
(0.061) (0.085) (0.092) (0.054) (0.058) (0.087) (0.086) (0.052) (0.053) (0.075) (0.080) (0.048) (0.087) (0.131) (0.149) (0.069)
weakly prot. 0.020 0.028 -0.031 -0.018 0.003 0.036 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.048) (0.066) (0.072) (0.042) (0.047) (0.065) (0.070) (0.041) (0.044) (0.061) (0.066) (0.039) (0.069) (0.102) (0.118) (0.054)
tech. lead 0.007 0.010 -0.011 -0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.007 -0.004 0.006 0.009 -0.009 -0.006 0.004 0.006 -0.007 -0.003
(0.016) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.025) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.019) (0.028) (0.032) (0.015)
APP 0.053*** 0.073*** -0.079*** -0.046*** 0.059*** 0.082*** -0.089*** -0.056*** 0.078*** 0.078*** -0.084*** -0.050*** 0.052** 0.077*** -0.088*** -0.040**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.027) (0.032) (0.016)
log(emp.) 0.004 0.006 -0.006 -0.004 0.007 0.005 -0.007 -0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.011 0.017 -0.019 -0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007)
cap. intensity -0.050 -0.069 0.075 0.044 -0.033 -0.045 0.049 0.029 -0.029 -0.040 0.043 0.025 -0.045 -0.067 0.077 0.035
(0.055) (0.077) (0.083) (0.048) (0.055) (0.076) (0.083) (0.048) (0.053) (0.075) (0.081) (0.048) (0.096) (0.141) (0.163) (0.074)
cooperation -0.020 -0.028 0.030 0.018 -0.019 -0.027 0.029 0.017 -0.011 -0.016 0.017 0.010 -0.027 -0.040 0.047 0.021
(0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.019) (0.027) (0.032) (0.015)
market novelty -0.024 -0.036 0.040 0.023 -0.021 -0.030 0.030 0.021 -0.022 -0.030 0.033 0.019 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.017) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.030) (0.035) (0.016)
diversification 0.023 0.032 -0.034 -0.020 0.025 0.033 -0.037 -0.022 0.025 0.034 -0.037 -0.022 0.028 0.042 -0.048 -0.022
(0.033) (0.045) (0.049) (0.028) (0.033) (0.024) (0.049) (0.028) (0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.028) (0.037) (0.053) (0.061) (0.028)
large # of firms 0.052** 0.072** -0.078** -0.046** 0.045 0.067 -0.077 -0.035
(0.025) (0.033) (0.037) (0.022) (0.030) (0.043) (0.051) (0.023)
med. # of firms 0.066*** 0.092*** -0.099*** -0.059*** 0.058** 0.086*** -0.099*** -0.045**
(0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.018) (0.023) (0.032) (0.037) (0.018)
product old 0.036 0.050 -0.055 -0.032 0.039 0.055 -0.059 -0.035 0.022 0.032 -0.037 -0.017
(0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022) (0.025) (0.038) (0.043) (0.020)
tech. obsolete 0.056*** 0.078*** -0.085*** -0.049*** 0.056*** 0.078*** -0.085*** -0.050*** 0.052** 0.077*** -0.088*** -0.040**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.020) (0.028) (0.032) (0.017)
EU -0.008 -0.11 0.012 0.007 -0.011 -0.016 0.019 0.009
(0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) (0.023) (0.033) (0.038) (0.017)
non EU -0.006 -0.009 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.018) (0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.021) (0.030) (0.035) (0.016)
east 0.021 0.028 -0.031 -0.018 0.017 0.023 -0.025 -0.015 0.010 0.014 -0.015 -0.009 0.014 0.021 -0.024 -0.011
(0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.027) (0.030) (0.014)
industries included included included included
Log likelihood -571.82 -563.72 -556.33 -369.05
Adj. R2 0.032 0.045 0.058 0.054
χ2(all) 40.16*** 60.99*** 80.99*** 48.48***
χ2(ind) 13.78 14.73 17.16* 10.43
No. of obs. 527 527 527 360
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects for an ordered probit for the estimation of threat of entry. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means and standard errors are calculated with the delta method. The effect
the interaction term is included in the overall effects of its components technologicallead and knowledgespillover.
Adj. R2 is equivalent to McFadden’s adj. R2.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies.
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Table 5: Ordered Probit for Threat of Entry Estimation – Robustness Checks
new delaying def. new strongly protective def. Citations
threat strong medium weak no strong medium weak no strong medium weak no
delaying -0.029** -0.040** 0.043** 0.025** -0.030** -0.041** 0.045** 0.026**
(0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012)
strongly protective 0.025 0.035 -0.037 -0.022 -0.018 -0.024 0.026 0.016
(0.044) (0.062) (0.066) (0.040) (0.087) (0.120) (0.130) (0.077)
weakly protective -0.004 -0.006 0.007 0.004 0.016 0.023 -0.024 -0.014
(0.046) (0.063) (0.068) (0.041) (0.029) (0.041) (0.044) (0.026)
citations -0.025* -0.034* 0.037* 0.022*
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012)
patent stock 0.160 0.215 -0.233 -0.142
(0.429) (0.577) (0.623) (0.383)
technological lead 0.006 0.009 -0.010 -0.006 0.007 0.009 -0.010 -0.006 0.007 0.013 -0.010 -0.010
(0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016)
appropriability 0.056*** 0.078*** -0.084*** -0.050*** 0.056*** 0.077*** -0.084*** -0.050*** 0.055*** 0.086*** -0.082*** -0.059***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018)
log(employees) 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.007 -0.007 -0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
capital intensity -0.028 -0.039 0.042 0.025 -0.029 -0.041 0.044 0.026 -0.028 -0.038 0.041 0.025
(0.053) (0.075) (0.080) (0.048) (0.053) (0.075) (0.081) (0.048) (0.054) (0.073) (0.078) (0.048)
cooperation -0.012 -0.017 0.018 0.011 -0.009 -0.017 0.018 0.011 -0.014 -0.019 0.020 0.012
(0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.014)
market novelty -0.022 -0.030 0.033 0.019 -0.012 -0.031 0.033 0.020 -0.017 -0.022 0.024 0.015
(0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015)
diversification 0.024 0.034 -0.037 -0.022 0.025 0.035 -0.037 -0.022 0.021 0.028 -0.030 -0.018
(0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.028) (0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.028) (0.032) (0.043) (0.046) (0.028)
large no. of firms 0.052** 0.072** -0.078** -0.046** 0.051** 0.072** -0.077** -0.046** 0.048* 0.064** -0.070** -0.043*
(0.025) (0.033) (0.037) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.037) (0.022) (0.025) (0.032) (0.036) (0.022)
medium no. of firms 0.066*** 0.092*** -0.099*** -0.059*** 0.066*** 0.092*** -0.099*** -0.059*** 0.055*** 0.075*** -0.081*** -0.049***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.028) (0.018)
product old 0.040* 0.055 -0.060* -0.035 0.040* 0.056 -0.060* -0.036 0.037 0.050 -0.054 -0.033
(0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.033) (0.021)
tech. obsolete 0.056*** 0.078*** -0.085*** -0.050*** 0.056*** 0.077*** -0.084*** -0.050*** 0.057*** 0.077*** -0.083*** -0.051***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016)
EU -0.008 -0.011 0.011 0.007 -0.007 -0.011 0.012 0.007 -0.008 -0.010 0.011 0.007
(0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) (0.019)
non EU -0.007 -0.009 0.010 0.006 -0.008 -0.009 0.009 0.006 -0.015 -0.020 0.022 0.013
(0.018) (0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.016)
east 0.011 0.015 -0.016 -0.009 0.010 0.013 -0.014 -0.009 0.006 0.008 -0.009 -0.005
(0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016)
industry dummies included included included
Log likelihood -556.42 -556.42 -572.28
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.058 0.058 0.055
χ2(all) 79.10*** 80.42*** 73.15***
χ2(ind) 17.03* 17.09*
No. of observations 527 527 539
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects for an ordered probit for the estimation of threat of entry. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means and standard errors are calculated
with the delta method. The effect of the interaction term is included in the overall effects of its components technologicallead and knowledgespillover.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies.
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